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The Wisdom of Universal DNA Collection:
A Reply to Professor Meghan J. Ryan
Arnold H. Loewy*
I want to begin by thanking Professor Meghan J. Ryan for inviting me
to respond to her important commentary on DNA evidence. I also want to
thank the SMU Science & Technology Law Review for allowing me to share
its pages with Professor Ryan regarding this topic.
My initial article was not designed to paint DNA as a perfect panacea to
solve all the world's crimes with omniscient accuracy. No methodology in
human hands is that efficient. What I did intend to say, and what I continue
to maintain, is that the availability of universal DNA will greatly improve the
resolution of crimes. I also maintain that the related cost to individual privacy
will not outweigh the benefit conferred through the availability of universal
DNA.
Professor Ryan suggests that "because we live in a system with limited
resources, investing in the universal collection of DNA will likely result in
scaling down law enforcement resources elsewhere, such as by reducing the
number of crime scene investigators or police officers on the street.", If I
thought that she were correct, I would be reluctant to advocate my DNA
proposal. But I think Professor Ryan is incorrect.
DNA collection involves two principle elements: collecting and analyz-
ing. Collection is easy under my proposal; DNA will simply be taken as part
of the many procedures hospitals already perform on newborn babies. As for
the already existing population, the cost of collection should be relatively
minimal. How much expertise does it take to monitor somebody spitting into
a cup?
Of course, there will be additional costs to analyze the DNA.2 But the
analysis is done by scientists, not detectives. To the extent that law enforce-
ment has totally inflexible budgets, the cost of DNA scientists might contrib-
ute to a minor reduction in available detectives, but I doubt the reduction will
be too significant.3 First, I do not believe that most municipal budgets are
that inflexible. Second, the advent of universal DNA should reduce the need
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1. Meghan J. Ryan, The Privacy, Probability, and Political Pitfalls of Universal
DNA Collection, 20 SMU Sci. TECH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017).
2. See DNA Testing Services, TRINITY DNA SoLunoNs (2011), http://www.trini
tydna.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=services.viewltem&itemid=3.
3. See DNA for Police Investigations, CENTER FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL-
Icy (2013), http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/
research-evidence-review/dna-for-police-investigations/.
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for as many detectives. Regardless, a careful budget planner could surely add
DNA testers without breaking the budget.
Professor Ryan also discusses potential enforcement difficulties with
getting people to willingly provide DNA.4 She criticizes my proposal by sug-
gesting that those most likely to commit a crime will be the least likely to
provide DNA.5 Of course, under my proposal, contribution of DNA is
mandatory-not a choice.6 But for the sake of argument, suppose a hypothet-
ical criminal (Joe) refuses to contribute his DNA. If Joe is later arrested for
committing a rape where DNA evidence was found, Joe's DNA will be taken
by law enforcement regardless of whether Joe consents. If Joe's DNA
matches, he will be charged with both rape and failure to register his DNA.
More generally, Professor Ryan criticizes my reliance on the interests of
the innocent, contending that the framers would have disagreed with the pro-
posal7 and that reliance on the interests of the innocent "could exacerbate
racial and other explicit and implicit biases on which police suspicion is
often at least in part based."8 Despite the fact that some of our framers may
have been perceived as criminals by the British, 9 1 seriously doubt that they
were concerned with making it harder to convict the guilty. If that were the
concern, then why even allow warrant searches based on probable cause?o
Obviously, the framers sought to protect the innocent-not the guilty-from
overbearing searches that were practically punitive even if no evidence of
guilt was discovered. Providing DNA is in no way comparably punitive, in-
trusive, or harmful to the innocent.
Further, Professor Ryan's concern with exacerbating racial and other
biases is both wrong and perverse." Focusing on protecting the innocent will
eliminate such biases. Suppose the most vehemently racist police officer dis-
covers a murdered rape victim lying in the gutter of a city street. His reaction
is: "Some [n-word] did this. We've got to find him, get him off the street,
and make this a safer community." If DNA evidence is found and testing
reveals that the rapist is in fact white, all black men are immediately exoner-
ated, regardless of the police officer's racism. Perhaps the officer will even-
tually begin to avoid drawing conclusions based on his biases. For some,
4. Meghan J. Ryan, Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law, Debate with Profes-
sor Arnold Loewy at the SMU Criminal Law Society DNA Database Debate:
Should Feds Have Your DNA? (Oct. 2, 2015).
5. Id.
6. See Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48
TEX. TECH L. REV. 261, 262 (2015); Ryan, supra note 1, at 2 n.9.
7. Ryan, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
11. Ryan, supra note 1.
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biases may even wane with time. Regardless, having more DNA evidence
only helps to prevent the wrongful conviction of every person and of any
race.
I absolutely share Professor Ryan's opposition to venous blood draws.12
Thankfully, intrusive blood draws are unnecessary; saliva contains DNA. In
Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that blood draws require
a warrant, but breathalyzers are not sufficiently intrusive to require a war-
rant. 13 A breathalyzer test is similar to "collecting a DNA sample by rubbing
a swab on the inside of a person's cheek."l4 Yet, breathalyzers do not require
a warrant.' 5 Neither should spitting in a cup.
Considering another perspective, thermal imaging in surveillance activi-
ties is prohibited due to the capability of detecting innocent activity in the
home.16 But constant video surveillance is permissible17 and arguably more
intrusive than universal DNA collection. An innocent person might not want
a video recording for the world to see exactly when he was at Home Depot,
particularly if he was holding hands with a woman other than his wife. None-
theless, this constant public surveillance is constitutionally permitted. -
So, is collecting DNA more intrusive than constant surveillance? I think
that the answer depends on the permitted uses of the DNA. Of course, if the
DNA can be given to an insurance company who can then determine that the
person from whom the DNA was taken has a propensity for breast cancer,
such an act would be patently unacceptable. But if strictly enforced rules
limit the uses of DNA to identifying (or excluding) suspected criminals,
identifying amnesiacs or dead bodies, or determining paternity, much of the
objections to DNA collection disappear.
Additionally, Professor Ryan argues that universal collection of DNA is
not particularly necessary because we already have the DNA of most
criminals, and an innocent person can clear his name by simply providing a
DNA sample.' 8 She further argues that frequently "too little DNA is found at
crime scenes."' 9 Let us discuss each of these points.
The fact that law enforcement officials have the DNA of previously
convicted (or even arrested) criminals is insufficient. DNA has been useful in
getting vicious, but otherwise undetected, criminals off the street. Rufus
12. Id.
13. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163 (2016).
14. Id. at 2164.
15. See id.
16. Ryan, supra note 1.
17. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951,
954 (2009) (quoting CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 109 (2007)).
18. Ryan, supra note 1.
19. Id.
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King, of Maryland v. King is a perfect example.20 The DNA sample taken
after King's 2009 arrest linked him to the DNA from a 2003 rape of which he
was ultimately convicted. Serendipitous after-the-fact discovery of DNA
linking to a prior crime is typical of those that originate from mandatory
DNA sampling of criminals. But this in no way helps to solve the numerous
crimes committed by people who are never caught committing a subsequent
cnme.
I enjoy watching an Investigation Discovery channel program called
"Unusual Suspects."21 This program frequently features a person who com-
mitted a crime in year one.2 2 Then, in year thirty, that person is finally caught
committing another crime. The DNA is then discovered and used to convict
the person for the crime committed three decades prior.23 If his DNA were
available in the first instance, it would be unnecessary to wait thirty years to
get the conviction. And, of course, those who never commit another crime
will never be discovered, often getting away with horrible crimes.
It is good policy to allow a person to provide his or her DNA to law
enforcement officials in order to establish his or her innocence. But a univer-
sal database could often end the most immediate suspicion of the innocent.
Certainly, if I were a possible criminal suspect, I would be quite content if
the police could simply compare my DNA to that of the perpetrator and,
establish my innocence before ever even allowing a slight suspicion to possi-
bly become an impression. Of course, under our current system, I could ex-
culpate myself by providing a DNA sample. But a universal DNA database
would yield a superior result by often saving the innocent from the stress and
trouble of being wrongfully suspected in the first place.
Finally, Professor Ryan suggests that sometimes the perpetrator will
leave insufficient DNA to test.24 Of course, in that case, my proposal is un-
helpful, though it also would do no harm. I began by noting that my proposal
is not a panacea for solving all of the world's crimes. Obviously, when no (or
an insufficient amount of) DNA is left, my proposal will not help. But the
fact that universal collection of DNA will not help solve every crime does
not mean that it will not help solve a lot of them.
Given the small cost and the large benefit, a universal DNA database
should be implemented.
20. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1958 (2013).
21. Unusual Suspects (Investigation Discovery).
22. See generally id.
23. See generally id.
24. Ryan, supra note 1.
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